What happened

Commercial vessels continue to transit the Strait of Hormuz, but traffic weakened substantially during the week of 5 to 11 October 2026 as attacks on merchant shipping persisted.

Kpler Risk and Compliance data published by MarineTraffic recorded 143 crossings during the week, down 29.6 percent from 203 in the previous week. Inbound movements fell to 60 from 94, while outbound movements declined to 83 from 109. Daily crossings ranged from 32 on 5 October to seven on 10 October.

The decline followed a period in which Gulf exports and Strait traffic had recovered significantly from earlier wartime disruption. Reuters, citing Kpler data, reported on 8 October that only seven commodity vessels had crossed on 6 October, the lowest daily level since 23 July. Crude movements through the Strait were estimated at about 10.1 million barrels per day, around 74 percent of the pre-war level.

The security environment also deteriorated. MarineTraffic reported that the International Maritime Organization had confirmed thirteen additional incidents involving merchant vessels between 29 September and 10 October, eight of them in the Strait itself. UK Maritime Trade Operations separately reported multiple tanker attacks and suspicious activity during early October, including vessels struck by unidentified projectiles and an inbound tanker instructed by the IRGC to turn back.

Evidence and limitations

The strongest traffic evidence is the Kpler Risk and Compliance dataset reported by MarineTraffic. Its weekly count covers commercial crossings but remains preliminary because vessels operating without normal tracking visibility can be identified retrospectively.

Different datasets can produce different daily crossing totals because they classify vessel types, routes and incomplete AIS observations differently. Individual daily counts should therefore not be treated as a complete census of all maritime movement through the Strait.

The attack picture is supported by UKMTO incident reporting and IMO-confirmed cases. Attribution for individual projectile strikes is not always established publicly at the time of reporting, so this record does not attribute attacks beyond what the cited authorities or reporting establish.

Confidence: High that commercial traffic continues and that activity fell materially during the week to 11 October. High that the security environment deteriorated. Moderate for precise comparisons with normal pre-war traffic because measurement methodologies differ and dark transits can alter retrospective totals.

Assessment

The Strait of Hormuz should not currently be described as closed. Commercial ships are continuing to cross it every day, including laden vessels. The more accurate description is a functioning but severely restricted maritime chokepoint in which security risk is suppressing traffic and influencing routing decisions.

The most significant signal is the reversal in momentum. September had demonstrated that commercial flows could recover despite the conflict. The early October decline shows that this recovery remains fragile and can be reversed quickly by renewed attacks and coercive activity against shipping.

Routing data reinforce that conclusion. Of the 143 crossings recorded from 5 to 11 October, 85 were classified as route undetermined and 57 used the Iranian Unilateral Scheme. Only one outbound vessel was recorded using the Negotiated Corridor Omani Waters, while no crossings used the established Hormuz Traffic Separation Scheme during the period.

Why it matters

The strategic question is no longer simply whether Iran can physically close the Strait. The more useful measure is whether commercial operators can use it at sufficient scale and acceptable risk.

Continued crossings demonstrate that Hormuz remains navigable. Falling inbound traffic, repeated attacks, opaque routing and elevated insurance and security costs nevertheless indicate that normal commercial access has not been restored.

Future evidence of sustained growth in inbound crossings, renewed use of established navigation corridors, declining attack frequency and durable diplomatic arrangements would indicate genuine reopening. A further decline in entries or withdrawal by major tanker operators would point in the opposite direction even if some vessels continued to transit.

Sources